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SHIELDING THE PUBLIC INTEREST: WHAT 
CANADA CAN LEARN FROM THE UNITED 
STATES IN THE WAKE OF NATIONAL POST 
AND GLOBE & MAIL 
Jason D. Burke* 
Abstract: In Canada and the United States, freedom of the press is among 
the most fundamental rights of citizens; yet, the exact contours of this 
freedom are still hotly debated. One contested question concerns the right 
of a journalist to protect the identity of his or her confidential sources. In 
Canada, two recent Supreme Court decisions established that a journalist 
may have a privilege to protect the identity of his or her confidential 
sources. This Note argues that the case-by-case determination with a pre-
sumption in favor of disclosure that these two cases establish is insuffi-
cient to protect the strong interest in a free press, which is bolstered by 
the ability to use confidential sources. Rather, Canada should legislatively 
enact a shield law based on those of many U.S. states in which the privi-
lege is extended broadly and is nearly absolute, with only limited circum-
stances in which the state can compel disclosure. 
Introduction 
 For years, Canada has been one of the countries leading the world 
in freedom of the press.1 In 2010, Reporters Without Borders ranked 
Canada twenty-first out of 178 nations in its annual survey, the Press 
Freedom Index.2 Indeed, in the years between 2002 and 2010, Canada 
never fell below the twenty-first position on this survey.3 
 Despite its highly developed freedom of the press, Canadian jour-
nalists have experienced certain setbacks in their quest for full freedom 
 
* Jason Burke is the Senior Note Editor for the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. 
1 See, e.g., Press Freedom Index 2010, Reporters Without Borders, http://en.rsf.org/ 
press-freedom-index-2010,1034.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2012); Press Freedom Index 2009, 
Reporters Without Borders, http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2009,1001.html (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2012). 
2 See Press Freedom Index 2010, supra note 1. 
3 See id. To view Canada’s rank in any year from 2002 to 2009, choose the appropriate 
year from the drop-down menu titled “Look up other years,” available at http://en.rsf.org/ 
press-freedom-index-2010,1034.html. 
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of the press.4 For example, in 2010, the Supreme Court of Canada up-
held a broad ban against the publication of information arising out of 
bail hearings.5 In 2009, a federal court in Canada limited public access 
to information when it denied a professor-journalist’s request to review 
government information about human rights in Afghanistan.6 Further, 
after a 2004 provision of the Criminal Code allowed journalists to be a 
source of evidence in certain criminal investigations, several journalists 
had to fight to keep their notes and photographs private.7 
 Part I of this Note lays out the facts of several key cases from the 
highest courts in Canada and the United States regarding the journal-
ist-source privilege. Part II discusses the importance of confidential 
sources and the current state of the law with regard to a privilege for 
journalists to protect the identity of their confidential sources under 
Canadian and U.S. law. Part III shows how the National Post standard is 
insufficient to protect the journalist-source relationship and then pro-
poses that the Parliament of Canada (Parliament) legislatively enact a 
shield law to address these issues. It goes on to use the large body of 
work about the journalist-source privilege in the United States to dis-
cuss how Parliament should address two of the biggest issues regarding 
shield laws: the extent of the privilege and to whom the privilege is ex-
tended. 
I. Background 
A. The Tenuousness of Confidential Sources in Canada 
 One particular aspect of freedom of the press has recently seen a 
great deal of legal flux: the privilege of journalists to maintain the con-
fidentiality of their sources.8 Over the past several years, various Cana-
dian journalists have been compelled to turn over their confidential 
                                                                                                                      
4 See infra text accompanying notes 5–7. 
5 CJFE Disappointed in Outcome of Publication Bans Case at Supreme Court, Canadian 
Journalists for Free Expression ( June 10, 2010), http://www.cjfe.org/resources/me- 
dia_releases/cjfe-disappointed-outcome-publication-bans-case-supreme-court. 
6 CJFE Disappointed by Decision in Access to Information Case, Canadian Journalists for 
Free Expression (Apr. 5, 2009), http://www.cjfe.org/node/272. 
7 CJFE Distressed by Court Approval of Seizure of Photographs, Canadian Journalists for 
Free Expression ( June 29, 2008), http://www.cjfe.org/node/246. 
8 Compare R. v. Nat’l Post, 2010 SCC 16, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 477, ¶ 77 (Can.) (holding that 
a defendant journalist must turn over a piece of physical evidence that may have revealed 
the identity of his confidential source), with Globe & Mail v. Canada (Attorney Gen.), 2010 
SCC 41, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 592, ¶ 102 (Can.) (holding that a defendant journalist may be 
able to keep the identity of his source confidential, pending review by a lower court). 
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sources.9 Two recent cases on this issue that found their way to the Ca-
nadian Supreme Court are R. v. National Post10 and Globe & Mail v. Can-
ada.11 In the first case, the Canadian Supreme Court decided that the 
privilege of journalists to keep their sources confidential is not an es-
sential part of the right to freedom of the press guaranteed by the Ca-
nadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter).12 Instead, the Ca-
nadian Supreme Court held that there must be a case-by-case inquiry 
that balances the interest of a free press with the state’s interest in the 
disclosure of information at trial.13 The second case on this issue hand-
ed down in 2010 followed National Post and found that the correct pro-
cedure for analyzing whether a source should remain confidential is a 
case-by-case balancing test.14 Nevertheless, in that case, the Canadian 
Supreme Court used the same balancing test to come out to a starkly 
different result; namely, that the source may be able to remain confi-
dential, pending further analysis by a lower court.15 
1. The Facts of R. v. National Post 
 The facts of this case arise out of the possession of an envelope and 
document purported to be from the Business Development Bank of 
Canada (BDBC) showing that Prime Minister of Canada Jean Chrétien 
was engaged in a serious financial conflict of interest.16 The appellant 
in this case, Andrew McIntosh, was a reporter with the Canadian news-
paper, the National Post, for over six years between August 1998 and 
February 2005.17 During his time with the National Post, McIntosh deep-
ly investigated Chrétien’s involvement with the Grand-Mère Golf Club, 
located in Chrétien’s home riding in Quebec.18 During the course of 
this investigation, McIntosh came to suspect that Chrétien had been 
involved in questionable activities with the Auberge Grand-Mère, a ho-
tel located next to the golf club.19 Over the course of his investigation, 
McIntosh contacted a person, known as Confidential Source X (X), but 
                                                                                                                      
9 See, e.g., Nat’l Post, [2010] 1 S.C.R. at ¶ 77. 
10 See [2010] 1 S.C.R. 477. 
11 See generally [2010] 2 S.C.R. 592. 
12 See Nat’l Post, [2010] 1 S.C.R. ¶ 41. 
13 See id. ¶ 55. 
14 See Globe & Mail, [2010] 2 S.C.R. ¶ 65. 
15 Compare id. at ¶ 102, with Nat’l Post, [2010] 1 S.C.R. ¶ 77. 
16 Nat’l Post, [2010] 1 S.C.R. ¶ 4. 
17 Id. ¶ 8. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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X was not willing to communicate with him.20 Thereafter, Confidential 
Source Y (Y) contacted McIntosh with important information that he 
or she would disclose in return for a blanket, unconditional promise of 
confidentiality.21 Y indicated that he or she was acting on behalf of X, 
who had important information about the Auberge Grand-Mère loan.22 
McIntosh, as part of his job, was authorized to give such promises of 
confidentiality, and this particular promise was made with the approval 
of his editor-in-chief.23 With these materials, which appeared to be le-
gitimate, McIntosh wrote that Chrétien had contacted the BDBC and 
lobbied for the approval of a loan to the Auberge Grand-Mère, an alle-
gation that Chrétien confirmed.24 
 Months later, McIntosh received a document that purported to be 
the internal authorization for a BDBC loan to the Auberge Grand-
Mère.25 This document also allegedly showed that the Auberge Grand-
Mère owed a debt to JAC Consultants, a company owned by the Chré-
tien family.26 If true, these allegations would be a major scandal impli-
cating the Prime Minister.27 A week after McIntosh received the docu-
ment, X requested a meeting with him.28 X requested that McIntosh 
dispose of the document for fear that the police may obtain it in order 
to try to ascertain its source.29 McIntosh stated that he would not dis-
pose of the document, but would keep his promise of absolute confi-
dentiality, so long as he believed X had not intentionally misled him.30 
McIntosh testified that he believed X to be a reliable source, and that if 
the document were forged, he did not think that X knew it.31 Thereaf-
ter, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) met with McIntosh 
and several National Post editors; National Post counsel refused to com-
ply with the RCMP’s request to produce the document and envelope, 
and McIntosh refused to identify the source.32 
 In 2002, the RCMP applied for an order to produce the document 
and envelope, because it could not get the necessary information else-
                                                                                                                      
20 Id. 
21 Id. ¶ 9. 
22 Nat’l Post, [2010] 1 S.C.R. ¶ 11. 
23 Id. ¶ 9. 
24 Id. ¶ 11. 
25 Id. ¶ 12. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Nat’l Post, [2010] 1 S.C.R. ¶ 16. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. ¶ 17. 
31 Id. ¶ 18. 
32 Id. ¶ 19. 
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where.33 The judge ordered that McIntosh produce the letter and en-
velope because they were the substance of the crime and may have con-
tained physical evidence such as DNA.34 The appellants applied to 
quash the orders and the reviewing judge set them aside, stating that 
the damage to freedom of expression did not outweigh the remote pos-
sibility that the production of the requested evidence would lead to a 
conviction.35 This decision was later reversed by the Ontario Court of 
Appeal.36 It is with this factual and procedural background that the 
case proceeded to the Canadian Supreme Court.37 
                                                                                                                     
2. The Facts of Globe & Mail v. Canada (Attorney General) 
 The Globe & Mail case followed just months after National Post and 
addressed the same general question of what privilege journalists have 
to keep their sources confidential.38 This case arose out of the litigation 
surrounding the so-called Sponsorship Scandal.39 After the failed at-
tempt by Quebec to secede from Canada in 1995, the federal govern-
ment came up with the Sponsorship Program to increase the federal 
government’s visibility in Quebec.40 At this time, Daniel Leblanc was a 
journalist with the Globe & Mail, and wrote a series of articles about the 
Sponsorship Program.41 Notably, he leveled the serious allegation that 
public funds had been misused throughout the Sponsorship Program.42 
Leblanc obtained his information from a confidential source known 
only as MaChouette.43 Through their correspondence, he pledged to 
protect her confidentiality.44 
 The articles written by Leblanc generated significant media atten-
tion and a Royal Commission known as the Gomery Inquiry (Inquiry) 
was struck to investigate this scandal.45 As a result of the Inquiry, in 
2005, the Attorney General of Canada filed a motion in a Quebec court 
in an attempt to recoup the losses that the federal government had suf-
 
33 Id. ¶ 21. 
34 Nat’l Post, [2010] 1 S.C.R. ¶¶ 21–22. 
35 Id. ¶ 24. 
36 Id. 
37 See id. 
38 Globe & Mail, [2010] 2 S.C.R. ¶¶ 1–3; see Nat’l Post, [2010] 1 S.C.R. ¶¶ 1–3. 
39 Globe & Mail, [2010] 2 S.C.R. ¶ 2. 





45 Globe & Mail, [2010] 2 S.C.R. ¶ 5. 
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fered as a result of corruption in the Sponsorship Scandal.46 Based on 
its contention that the government knew about the Sponsorship Scan-
dal at an early date, Groupe Polygone, one defendant, raised a defense 
allowed by Quebec law.47 In order to support its defense, Groupe Poly-
gone requested an order forcing several people to give testimony in the 
hopes that it would help to out Leblanc’s confidential source, 
MaChouette.48 The Globe & Mail brought a motion attempting to re-
voke these orders, arguing that their effect was to breach the privilege 
of a journalist to keep his sources confidential.49 Leblanc testified in 
support of the Globe & Mail’s motion and was cross-examined by coun-
sel for Groupe Polygone.50 At several points during the cross-
examination, counsel for the Globe & Mail objected, stating that if Le-
blanc were to answer the questions, the effect would be to force him to 
disclose the true identity of MaChouette, in violation of the oath of 
confidentiality given by Leblanc to his informant.51 The judge at the 
trial refused to grant these objections as he did not recognize a journal-
ist-source privilege.52 After a Court of Appeal refused to hear the ap-
peal on this issue, the Globe & Mail sought to discontinue hearings on 
its motion to revoke the earlier orders to protect Leblanc from disclos-
ing his source.53 The trial judge did not grant this discontinuance and 
the Quebec Court of Appeals proceeded to dismiss the appeal.54 It is in 
this context that the issue of journalist-source privilege came to the Ca-
nadian Supreme Court in this case.55 
                                                                                                                     
B. The U.S. Experience with Journalists and Confidential Sources 
1. From Branzburg to Judith Miller: A Troubling Pattern of Forced 
Disclosure of Confidential Sources in the United States 
 Branzburg v. Hayes was the consolidation of three different cases all 
concerning whether compelling journalists to appear before grand ju-
ries violates the First Amendment’s guarantees of free speech and free 
 
46 Id. ¶ 7. 
47 Id. ¶ 8. The defendant “sought to advance a defence of prescription under the Civil 
Code of Québec.” Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. ¶ 9. 
50 Id. 




55 See id. ¶¶ 9, 14. 
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press.56 The first of the component cases came before the Supreme 
Court of the United States (U.S. Supreme Court) from two different 
judgments by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.57 Branzburg was a jour-
nalist for the Courier-Journal in Louisville, Kentucky, who wrote a piece 
about creating hashish from marijuana.58 He was subpoenaed to appear 
before a grand jury and reveal his sources, but he refused.59 The trial 
court judge ordered him to answer, stating, inter alia, that the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (Constitution) did not afford him 
immunity from answering.60 The second case involving Branzburg arose 
from an article that he had written about drug use in Frankfort, Ken-
tucky, in which he had interviewed several drug users.61 He once again 
protested being brought before a grand jury and once again, the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals rejected his arguments, which included a First 
Amendment argument.62 The U.S. Supreme Court granted Branzburg’s 
writ of certiorari to adjudicate the First Amendment issue.63 
 The second component case involved a judgment from the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.64 Pappas, a journalist and pho-
tographer, gained entrance to the inside of a restricted-entry Black 
Panther meeting.65 The condition of his entrance was that he would 
neither photograph nor discuss anything seen inside of the building, 
except as related to a possible police raid.66 Such a raid never hap-
pened and Pappas never published any story; however, he was sum-
moned before a grand jury but refused to answer questions about the 
meeting, claiming First Amendment immunity from answering such 
questions.67 The trial judge and later the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts rejected this contention, and the U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.68 
 The third component case involved Caldwell, a New York Times re-
porter in California who was also covering the Black Panther Party.69 He 
                                                                                                                      
56 See 407 U.S. 665, 667, 671, 675, 679 (1972). 
57 Id. at 667. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 668. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 669. 
62 Branzburg, 407 U.S. at 670. 
63 Id. at 671. 
64 Id. at 673. 
65 Id. at 672. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 672–73. 
68 Branzburg, 407 U.S. at 673–75. 
69 Id. at 675. 
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was summoned before a grand jury to testify and filed a motion to quash 
on First Amendment grounds.70 The District Court denied this motion 
but nevertheless held that Caldwell had a qualified privilege, which in-
cluded the right not to reveal confidential sources, associations, and in-
formation.71 The Court of Appeals reversed and held that, in this case, 
requiring the reporter to testify at all would deter his confidential 
sources from associating with him, thus abridging his First Amendment 
rights.72 As in the other two cases, the U.S. Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to consider this issue.73 Eventually, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that the First Amendment included no protection for confidential 
sources, effectively mandating that these three journalists comply with 
the orders to reveal the identities of their confidential sources.74 
 Decades later, the issue of protecting journalists’ confidential 
sources is still a pressing topic that generates much scholarly debate in 
the United States.75 In the first decade of the twenty-first century, U.S. 
courts attempted to force journalists to disclose their sources in numer-
ous high-profile cases.76 One of the most high-profile of all of these cas-
es, however, was that of Judith Miller of the New York Times.77 The action 
against Miller arose out of journalist Robert Novak’s disclosure of the 
identity of Valerie Plame, a Central Intelligence Agency operative.78 
Such unauthorized disclosure to unauthorized sources is a federal 
crime, and thus an investigation ensued.79 As part of this investigation, 
numerous journalists who had received this information from a number 
of confidential sources were subpoenaed to testify; among these report-
ers was Judith Miller.80 On August 12, 2004, Miller was subpoenaed to 
                                                                                                                      
70 Id. at 675–76. 
71 Id. at 677–78 (citing Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358, 362 (N.D. Cal. 1970)). 
72 Id. at 679. 
73 Id. at 671, 673–75, 679. 
74 See Branzburg, 407 U.S. at 708. 
75 See, e.g., Laurence B. Alexander, Looking Out for the Watchdogs: A Legislative Proposal 
Limiting the Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need of Protection for Sources and 
Information, 20 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 97, 102–03 (2002); Anthony L. Fargo, The Year of Leak-
ing Dangerously: Shadowy Sources, Jailed Journalists, and the Uncertain Future of the Federal Jour-
nalist’s Privilege, 14 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1063, 1068–72 (2006). 
76 See Alexander, supra note 75, at 1094–102 (discussing several recent press subpoena 
cases). 
77 See Daniel Joyce, The Judith Miller Case and the Relationship Between Reporter and Source: 
Competing Visions of the Media’s Role and Function, 17 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. 
L.J. 555, 557 (2007). 
78 See id. at 559–60. 
79 Id. at 560. 
80 See id. at 560–61. 
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testify in front of a grand jury to identify the identity of her source.81 
She refused and was held in contempt of court; however, she was spared 
from jail pending an appeal.82 The U.S. Supreme Court denied certio-
rari on Miller’s case on June 27, 2005, and on July 6, Miller was jailed for 
her continued refusal to disclose the identity of her source.83 She was 
held until September 29, when she received a waiver from her source 
and subsequently agreed to testify.84 
2. Protecting Journalists Through State Shield Laws 
 Many states have granted protection to the relationship between 
journalists and their confidential sources by passing shield laws.85 In 
fact, in March 2011, West Virginia’s legislature passed a shield law.86 
After being signed in April 2011, West Virginia became the fortieth 
state to pass a shield law; the District of Columbia also has a shield 
la 7 
 A shield law is a legislative enactment that lays out the rights of 
journalists and protects them from being forced to disclose, among oth-
er things, the identity of their confidential sources.
w.8
prisals to come forward with information of great import to the pub-
lic.90 
                                                                                                                     
88 The protections 
offered by these statutes vary greatly in nature, with some being incredi-
bly protective of journalists and forbidding compelled disclosure of con-
fidential sources in any circumstances, while others grant far narrower 
protections.89 The journalist-source privilege codified by these shield 
laws incentivizes sources that would otherwise stay silent for fear of re-
 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 561. 
83 Joyce, supra note 77, at 561. 
84 See id. 
85 Kristen Rasmussen, W. Va. Shield Bill Passed, Awaits Acting Governor’s Signature, Re-
porters Committee for Freedom Press (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.rcfp.org/newsitems/ 
index.php?i=11756. 
86 Id. 
87 Kristen Rasmussen, West Virginia Acting Governor Signs Reporter Shield Law, Re-
porters Committee for Freedom Press (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.rcfp.org/newsitems/ 
index.php?i=11810. 
88 See Jaime M. Porter, Note, Not Just “Every Man”: Revisiting the Journalist’s Privilege 
Against Compelled Disclosure of Confidential Sources, 82 Ind. L.J. 550, 561–62 (2007). 
89 Compare Mont. Code Ann. § 26-1-902 (2009) (granting absolute immunity to jour-
nalists seeking to protect the identity of their confidential sources), with Ga. Code Ann. 
§ 24-9-30 (2010) (providing several factors that can overcome the privilege). 
90 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Why We Need a Federal Reporter’s Privilege, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 
39, 41 (2005). 
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II. Discussion 
A. The Benefits and Costs of a Privilege Protecting Confidential Sources 
 The importance of using confidential sources has been well-doc- 
umented in numerous studies.91 At the most basic level, the goal of any 
privilege is “to promote open communication in circumstances in which 
society wants to encourage such communication.”92 In the context of 
journalists and confidential sources, there are often people with valu-
able information—information about political corruption, for exam-
ple—who may nevertheless withhold this information for fear of retalia-
tion or simply for fear of getting involved in an explosive situation.93 
Although the press is often a reliable disseminator of information of 
value to the public, such trepidation in a source may dissuade him from 
going public with important information if he has legitimate fears that 
his correspondence with a journalist may not be kept private.94 
 The number of journalists who have used confidential sources in 
their work is quite high; indeed, scholars have noted that the use of 
confidential sources provides a wide variety of benefits to journalists.95 
First, the use of confidential sources allows journalists to get their 
hands on information that they might not otherwise be able to ob-
tain.96 Second, it better allows journalists to develop relationships with 
sources.97 Third, the promise of confidentiality facilitates the building 
of trust between confidential sources and journalists.98 Fourth, confi-
dentiality aids journalists by “giving comfort, confidence, and protec-
tion to fearful sources.”99 
 A 1971 empirical study on the use of confidential sources by jour-
nalists documented the potential detrimental effects of subpoenaing 
journalists.100 According to this study, one negative effect of forcing 
                                                                                                                      
91 See, e.g., Vince Blasi, The Newsman’s Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 229, 
245–46 (1971); John E. Osborn, The Reporter’s Confidentiality Privilege: Updating the Empirical 
Evidence After a Decade of Subpoenas, 17 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 57, 63–67 (1985); Stone, 
supra note 90, at 41–43. 
92 Stone, supra note 90, at 39. 
93 Id. at 41. 
94 See id. at 42. 
95 Alexander, supra note 75, at 102 n.19 (citing Byron St. Dizier, Reporters’ Use of Confi-
dential Sources, 1974 and 1984: A Comparative Study, 6 Newspaper Res. J. 44, 46 (1985)); see 
infra text accompanying notes 96–99. 




100 Blasi, supra note 91, at 265–68. 
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journalists to disclose confidential sources rests with the journalist.101 
This effect is the “professionally incapacitating worry and hassle to 
which the reporter is subjected.”102 This translates into both a lack of 
time to do his job and cover his stories because the reporter is spending 
time dealing with myriad legal issues.103 The journalist must spend a 
great amount of time dealing with ethical worries, and may ultimately 
face jail time for refusing to comply with a subpoena.104 Another nega-
tive, yet intangible, effect is the drying up of sources that fear the sub-
poena threat.105 Although it is unclear whether sources that refuse to 
give information are uncooperative because of the fear that their con-
fidentiality may be violated, the study identified two tangible effects— 
based on the experience of reporters—of the subpoena threat.106 Some 
sources stopped allowing reporters to record conversations that could 
later be used as evidence.107 Further, the “cajoling and elaborate prom-
ises” necessary to ease the fears of some confidential sources could sig-
nificantly delay a key story.108 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
the ultimate negative effect of under-protecting source confidentiality 
is a complete refusal of a prospective source to give crucial informa-
tion.
gest stories are often those about corrupt public officials and confiden-
                                                                                                                     
109 
 Another empirical study published fourteen years later confirmed 
the previous study’s claims about the deleterious effects of subpoenaing 
journalists to force them to reveal their confidential sources.110 Impor-
tantly, this study found that every reporter interviewed had used a con-
fidential source at some point within the preceding ten years.111 More-
over, over half of the respondents indicated that they used such sources 
often.112 By a two-to-one margin, respondents stated that confidential 
sources were particularly important to their biggest stories—those 
nominated for a Pulitzer Prize.113 This appears to be because the big-
 
101 Id. at 265. 
102 Id. 
103 See id. at 265–66. 
104 Id. 
105 See id. at 266. 
106 Blasi, supra note 91, at 267–68. 
107 Id. at 267. 
108 Id. at 268. 
109 Id. 
110 See Osborn, supra note 91, at 72–77 (analyzing the empirical data regarding the ef-
fects of press subpoenas on journalists and their work). 
111 Id. at 72. 
112 Id. at 72–73. 
113 Id. at 74. 
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tiality in this kind of investigative journalism is almost a necessity.114 
Many reporters said that the lack of protection provided by U.S. law to 
promises of confidentiality did not affect them because they were will-
ing to go to jail rather than disclose source identities.115 However, the 
author concluded that “[t]he confidential relationship, so crucial a tool 
in gathering the news, cannot flourish indefinitely if supported solely 
by reporters’ willingness to go to jail.”116 Unsurprisingly, another even 
more recent empirical study generated extremely similar results.117 
 In contrast, allowing reporters not to disclose the identities of their 
confidential sources imposes various costs on society.118 Paramount 
among these is the violation of the legal maxim that in a fair system of 
justice, the public has the right to “every man’s evidence.”119 Allowing a 
journalist to abstain from testimony about the identity of a confidential 
source could deprive the public of valuable information that would al-
low justice to be done.120 
 However, there are strong counterpoints to the argument against 
recognizing a legal protection for confidential sources.121 First, if a 
would-be confidential source chooses not to come forward with his val-
uable information because of the threat of forced disclosure, the public 
will not have this valuable evidence.122 This means that the public ends 
up with the same amount of evidence with or without the privilege.123 
Second, it is likely that the most important confidential disclosures 
concern the kind of information that would place the source in serious 
                                                                                                                      
114 See id. 
115 Id. at 74–75. 
116 Osborn, supra note 91, at 77. 
117 RonNell Andersen Jones, Media Subpoenas: Impact, Perception, and Legal Protection in 
the Changing World of American Journalism, 84 Wash. L. Rev. 317, 353–74 (2008). In this 
study, the author found that subpoenas attempting to force journalists to reveal confiden-
tial sources both negatively affected newsroom time and cost media outlets money. Id. at 
354, 361. Further, many newspapers have changed their material retention policies to 
avoid subpoenas, which forces journalists to give up invaluable sources; many reporters 
have also had to abandon cases due to a subpoena threat. Id. at 364, 366. Journalists also 
believed that subpoena cases that received great amounts of publicity made their confiden-
tial sources uneasy, negatively affecting the number of potential informants willing to step 
forward with information. Id. at 368–69. Finally, and more intangibly, journalists reported 
concern about the media’s neutral role, and fear that media outlets would be used as tools 
for discovery. Id. at 373. 
118 See Stone, supra note 90, at 48. 
119 See 8 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
120 See David Abramowicz, Note, Calculating the Public Interest in Protecting Journalists’ 
Confidential Sources, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1949, 1952 (2008). 
121 See Stone, supra note 90, at 49–50. 
122 Id. at 49. 
123 See id. 
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jeopardy were the leak to be traced back to him.124 This would seem to 
indicate that the absence of a privilege is most likely to chill the very 
communications in which the public has the greatest interest.125 Third, 
there is little noticeable difference between law enforcement in states 
with an absolute privilege where a journalist can never be compelled to 
disclose his confidential source’s identity and in states with only a quali-
fied privilege where a journalist can be forced to disclose a source’s 
identity under certain circumstances.126 In this light, “it seems clear 
that the benefits we derive from the privilege significantly outweigh its 
negative effects on law enforcement.”127 
                                                                                                                     
B. Three Legal Bases for a Reporter’s Privilege in Canada and the Adoption of 
a Case-by-Case Approach in National Post 
 National Post stands as a major case addressing the ability of jour-
nalists to keep their sources confidential.128 In beginning its analysis, 
the Canadian Supreme Court emphasized the competing interests that 
are at stake when deciding whether a journalist should be compelled to 
disclose the identity of a confidential source.129 Specifically, the Cana-
dian Supreme Court stated that “[t]he investigation and punishment of 
crime is vital in a society based on the rule of law but so is the freedom 
of the press and other media of communication.”130 The general rule 
referenced by the Court is that the public has the right to every per-
son’s evidence.131 Nevertheless, the Canadian Supreme Court pointedly 
noted that this right is not absolute and proceeded to list myriad in-
stances in which “narrow exceptions have been recognized as necessary 
to further precisely defined and overriding public interests.”132 The 
Canadian Supreme Court noted, without information from confiden-
tial sources, “[i]mportant stories will be left untold, and the transpar-
ency and accountability of our public institutions will be lessened to the 
public detriment.”133 Therefore, the Canadian Supreme Court ulti-
 
124 See id. 
125 See id. 
126 See id. at 49–50. 
127 Stone, supra note 90, at 50. But see Alexander, supra note 75, at 102 (“[N]ewspapers 
in states with journalist-protecting shield laws do more investigative reporting and win 
more awards for their reporting than their counterparts in non-shield-law states.”). 
128 See R. v. Nat’l Post, 2010 SCC 16, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 477, ¶¶ 1–3 (Can.) 
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mately determined that the law accepts that in some instances, the pub-
lic’s interest in being informed by journalistic work will outweigh the 
state’s interest in effectively prosecuting crime.134 It is in these in-
stances, the Canadian Supreme Court reasoned, that a court should 
grant immunity to a journalist against the compelled disclosure of his 
or her confidential sources.135 
 Although the Canadian Supreme Court recognized that some sort 
of privilege did exist for journalists to maintain the confidentiality of 
sources, the question as to the source from which that immunity sprang 
still needed to be answered.136 Ultimately, after weighing the competing 
interests involved in granting journalists a privilege against compelled 
disclosure of confidential sources’ identities, the Canadian Supreme 
Court held that a journalist’s privilege to protect the confidentiality of 
secret sources should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.137 However, in 
coming to this holding, the Canadian Supreme Court also analyzed and 
rejected two other possible sources for the journalist-source privilege 
under the laws of Canada based on a variety of policy considerations.138 
1. The Constitutional Approach 
 The broadest source of the journalist’s privilege considered by the 
Court was the Charter.139 The relevant starting point for such a legal 
proposition is found in Section 2(b) of the Charter, which reads 
“[e]veryone has the following fundamental freedoms: . . . freedom of 
thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the 
press and other media of communication.”140 The interveners Cana-
dian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) and British Columbia Civil Lib-
erties Association claimed that the use of confidential sources was so 
pivotal to newsgathering that it should be treated as if it were a right 
expressly included in the Charter.141 
 CCLA put forth a test for determining when a journalist could in-
voke the protections of the Charter against a compelled disclosure of 
                                                                                                                      
134 Nat’l Post, [2010] 1 S.C.R. ¶ 34. 
135 See id. 
136 Id. ¶ 35. 
137 Id. ¶¶ 51–52. 
138 Id. ¶¶ 41–42. 
139 Id. ¶ 37. 
140 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, be-
ing Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c.11, § 2(b) (U.K.) [hereinafter Canadian Char-
ter]; see Nat’l Post, [2010] 1 S.C.R. ¶ 37. 
141 Nat’l Post, [2010] 1 S.C.R. ¶¶ 37–38. 
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confidential sources.142 Namely, they proposed that “immunity is estab-
lished by a claimant showing (i) that he or she is a journalist; (ii) en-
gaged in news gathering activity; (iii) who has acquired information 
under a promise of confidentiality.”143 The interveners pushing this 
position did not claim that this immunity was absolute.144 Section 1 of 
the Charter states that it “guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in 
it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”145 Therefore, 
the government could override the protections of Section 2 of the 
Charter by offering an acceptable justification under Section 1 of the 
Charter; however, the government, according to CCLA, would have to 
prove a “countervailing and fact-specific overriding public interest.”146 
Overall, this scheme would include a presumption of immunity that 
can be overridden only in extreme cases.147 
 The Canadian Supreme Court, however, rejected the Charter as 
the legal source of a journalist’s privilege against compelled disclosure 
of confidential sources.148 Its first objection to such a basis for the jour-
nalist’s privilege was that it viewed the claim that because the use of 
confidential sources was an important newsgathering technique, it was 
protected under the Charter as too farfetched.149 The Canadian Su-
preme Court took note of several different methods utilized by journal-
ists to gather news—some of them ethically questionable—and stated 
that it does not follow that each and every newsgathering technique 
considered important by journalists received protection from the Char-
ter.150 Secondly, the Canadian Supreme Court stated that Canadian 
courts have generally opposed grounding testimonial immunities in the 
constitution.151 Indeed, even the solicitor-client privilege that is “one of 
the most ancient and powerful privileges” is generally not given consti-
tutional status.152 Finally, the Canadian Supreme Court noted the diffi-
culty in defining to whom such a constitutional immunity would be ex-
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145 Canadian Charter, supra note 140, § 1. 
146 Nat’l Post, [2010] 1 S.C.R. ¶ 37. 
147 See id. 
148 See id. ¶ 41. 
149 Id. ¶ 38. 
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151 Id. ¶ 39. 
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tended.153 Recent jurisprudence made it clear that Section 2(b) protec-
tions belong to “everyone” and not merely to the traditional media.154 
The implication of the Charter’s words and the Canadian Supreme 
Court’s recent precedent is that a constitutional immunity would have 
to be extended to all citizens, not merely members of traditional media, 
like the appellant in National Post.155 The Court fully elucidates its fear, 
stating that allowing anybody to promise confidentiality to any source 
on any terms would be a huge impediment to effective law enforce-
ment.156 Ultimately, the Canadian Supreme Court concluded that his-
tory has proven that Section 2(b)’s aims could be accomplished with-
out constitutionalizing the journalist’s privilege and thus rejected using 
the Charter as the basis for this privilege.157 
2. The Class Privilege Model 
 After rejecting the Charter as the basis of the journalist’s privilege, 
the Canadian Supreme Court began to examine the common law as a 
source.158 At common law, there are two different kinds of privileges: 
class-based or case-by-case.159 The Court notes that the distinguishing 
factor of a class privilege is that the particular relationship being pro-
tected—the seminal example being the solicitor-client privilege—is so 
important that communications therein must be protected, even at the 
risk of interference with the judicial process.160 The Canadian Supreme 
Court, referencing R. v. Gruenke,161 noted that very few class privileges 
exist in Canada.162 Thus, the Court in National Post observed “[i]t is 
                                                                                                                      
153 See id. ¶ 40. 
154 Id.; see Grant v. Torstar, 2009 SCC 61, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640, ¶ 96 (Can.). 
155 See Nat’l Post, [2010] 1 S.C.R. ¶ 40. 
156 Id. (“To throw a constitutional immunity around the interactions of such a hetero-
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157 See id. ¶ 41. 
158 Id. ¶ 42. 
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161 [1991] 3 S.C.R. 263 (Can.). 
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likely that in future (sic) such ‘class’ privileges will be created, if at all, 
only by legislative action.”163 
 The Canadian Supreme Court also offered several compelling rea-
sons not to adopt a class-based privilege for journalists and their confi-
dential sources.164 First, unlike the case of the solicitor, in which the 
profession is highly regulated to maintain professional standards, the 
journalism profession is unregulated and professionalism is often sub-
par, if not completely lacking.165 Furthermore, the decision in Grant 
broadly defined the scope of journalism, thus further complicating the 
idea of extending a broad class based privilege to “journalists.”166 Sec-
ond, the Canadian Supreme Court pointed out the extreme difficulty 
in determining to whom the privilege belongs and thus the rights of 
the journalist and the confidential source if a class privilege were cre-
ated.167 Third, the Canadian Supreme Court noted that no set of crite-
ria had been proposed to determine when the privilege was created or 
lost.168 Among newspapers, practices concerning when a journalist 
could even promise confidentiality—a necessary precondition for the 
privilege to attach—varied considerably.169 Various media codes of eth-
ics also diverged on this question and thus offered no help or guid-
ance.170 Finally, the search for truth is of the utmost importance and 
that search is seriously limited by the granting of a class privilege.171 A 
case-by-case privilege is far more suited to adaptation when the circum-
stances warrant it than a class privilege.172 
3. The Case-by-Case Model of Privilege 
 The final option that the Canadian Supreme Court considered was 
to approach the question of a journalist’s privilege on a case-by-case 
basis.173 Numerous cases handed down by the Canadian Supreme 
Court before National Post had laid out an ad hoc inquiry involving the 
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balancing of interests through a multi-part test.174 This inquiry could 
be guided by the values enshrined in the Charter.175 The Canadian Su-
preme Court had previously established that it was appropriate that 
common law principles such as the case-by-case model of privilege 
could be adapted to take into account these Charter values.176 For ex-
ample, in Gruenke, the original claim was that Section 2(a) of the Char-
ter that protects freedom of religion also conferred a constitutional 
immunity for priests and penitents.177 While the Canadian Supreme 
Court in that case found religious liberty is an important value to be 
fostered, it ultimately rejected this broad claim.178 Instead, all of the 
interests at stake could be more adequately protected by the weighing 
of these factors against one another in a case-by-case analysis that frees 
courts to consider the totality of the circumstances and the strengths of 
the various rights implicated in any case.179 
 The four factors that should be considered in any case-by-case 
analysis of privilege are taken from John Henry Wigmore’s seminal text 
on common law evidence, and are thus referred to by the Canadian 
Supreme Court as the “Wigmore criteria.”180 Reiterating its earlier con-
clusions about the indispensability of investigative journalism in keep-
ing public institutions accountable to the public, the Canadian Su-
preme Court stated that this balancing test was a good way to allow 
courts the necessary flexibility to balance “the sometimes-competing 
interest of free expression and the administration of justice and other 
values that promote the public interest.”181 Ultimately, this is the ap-
proach adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court.182 
 The first criterion that must be established in a Wigmore analysis is 
that the communication originated “in a confidence that the identity of 
the informant will not be disclosed.”183 Second, “the confidence must 
be essential to the relationship in which the communication arises.”184 
Combined, these two factors mean that the privilege can only be in-
                                                                                                                      
174 See id. The Canadian Supreme Court cites to A. M. v. Ryan, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157, 
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voked where the information given by the secret source was unambigu-
ously conditioned upon the promise of confidentiality regarding the 
identity of the source.185 Third, “the relationship must be one which 
should be ‘sedulously fostered’ in the public good.”186 This require-
ment allows a court to consider different types of sources and journal-
ists.187 Fourth, if all of the first three criteria have been met, “the court 
must consider whether in the instant case the public interest served by 
protecting the identity of the informant from disclosure outweighs the 
public interest in getting at the truth.”188 Stating that this criterion 
“does most of the work,” the Canadian Supreme Court noted that after 
the first three factors have been met, thereby establishing the public’s 
interest in the particular journalist-source relationship, a court must 
weigh that value against countervailing interests.189 Critically, the Ca-
nadian Supreme Court held that, throughout the entire process, the 
burden of proof rests with the journalists seeking to establish a privi-
lege.190 Until all four Wigmore criteria are satisfactorily established, 
“[t]he evidence is presumptively compellable and admissible.”191 
                                                                                                                     
C. The Legal Situation in the United States 
1. Branzburg and a Lack of a Federal Guidance 
 In Branzburg, the U.S. Supreme Court held that journalists could 
not refuse to testify before a grand jury based on the First Amend-
ment.192 The Court emphasized its respect for the importance of a free 
press and explicitly protected newsgathering under the First Amend-
ment because “without some protection for seeking out the news, free-
 
185 Id. ¶ 56. 
186 Id. ¶ 53 (citing Wigmore, supra note 119, § 2285). 
187 Nat’l Post, [2010] 1 S.C.R. ¶ 57. The Court gave important guidance on this point, 
noting that “[t]he relationship between the source and a blogger might be weighed differ-
ently than in the case of a professional journalist . . . who is subject to much greater institu-
tional accountability within his or her own news organization.” Id. 
188 Id. ¶ 53. 
189 Id. ¶ 58. Listing some countervailing interests, the Court stated that a court should 
consider “public interest[s] such as the investigation of a particular crime (or national 
security, or public safety or some other public good).” Id. 
190 Id. ¶ 60. 
191 Id. 
192 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 665, 690 (1971). The U.S. Supreme Court stated 
that “until now the only testimonial privilege for unofficial witnesses that is rooted in the 
Federal Constitution is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 
We are asked to create another by interpreting the First Amendment to grant newsmen a 
testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy.” Id. at 689–90. 
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dom of the press could be eviscerated.”193 However, it found no direct 
incursions upon the freedom of the press in requiring a journalist to 
testify before a grand jury.194 Instead, the Court noted that every bur-
den placed upon the press does not violate the First Amendment, and 
proceeded to catalog numerous other instances in which governmental 
restrictions burdened the newsgathering function of the press but nev-
ertheless passed constitutional muster.195 After reviewing such evi-
dence, it noted that it was unsurprising that “the great weight of author-
ity is that newsmen are not exempt from the normal duty of appearing 
before a grand jury and answering questions relevant to a criminal in-
vestigation.”196 Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the no-
tion that its refusal to create First Amendment immunity for journalists 
would undermine the freedom of the press; indeed, it noted that this 
issue has not even been raised until 1958 and prior to that date, the 
press flourished.197 
 Interestingly, the majority addressed the contention that an in-
fringement upon First Amendment rights must be “no broader than 
necessary to achieve a permissible government purpose.”198 The U.S. 
Supreme Court found that the government had not abused its function 
and impacted protected First Amendment rights.199 Despite this hold-
ing, however, the majority stated that even tests that mandate the gov-
ernment provide a “‘compelling’ or ‘paramount’” state interest were 
satisfied in this case.200 It stated that “[i]f the test is that the govern-
ment ‘convincingly show a substantial relation between the information 
sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest,’” such 
a test was met.201 However, the majority did not state that this was in-
deed the test.202 Further, it noted that grand jury investigations without 
a legitimate purpose, instituted solely or primarily to harass the press, 
would raise different First Amendment issues and thus be unacceptable 
                                                                                                                      
193 Id. at 681. 
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as they “would have no justification.”203 Although the majority seemed 
to repudiate the need for a balancing test, such a statement raises the 
possibility that the justifications of the government should be balanced 
against the alleged violations of the First Amendment.204 
 Further complicating this analysis is the short, but poignant, con-
currence by Justice Powell.205 Justice Powell wrote separately to empha-
size that he viewed the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding as limited in na-
ture.206 Indeed, he emphasizes the majority’s respect for First 
Amendment freedoms and reiterates that the majority’s opinion as-
sures that “no harassment of newsmen will be tolerated.”207 Most im-
portantly, however, he emphasizes that 
the asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by 
the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press 
and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony 
with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital 
constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis ac-
cords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such 
questions.208 
Apparently, therefore, Justice Powell viewed the majority’s holding as 
affirmatively leaving open the possibility of a case-by-case model of priv-
ilege, similar to the holding of the Canadian Supreme Court in National 
Post.209 The lack of clarity about the journalist’s privilege in this ruling 
has created a great deal of uncertainty among federal courts trying to 
apply it to other cases about the journalist’s privilege.210 
2. State Laws: A National Trend Toward Shield Laws 
 Despite the lack of consensus in the federal courts about the exis-
tence of a reporter’s privilege, many states have established such a privi-
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lege.211 As of the time of this writing, forty states and the District of Co-
lumbia have enacted some form of shield law that establishes the privi-
lege of a journalist against being compelled to reveal the identity of 
confidential sources.212 
 States have written their shield laws in a variety of ways.213 The ex-
tent of the protections offered by these shield laws varies among the 
states, with some states offering complete immunity to journalists 
against the disclosure of confidential sources and others creating a 
qualified privilege.214 Further affecting the protection of journalists is 
how the acts define who qualifies for the privilege.215 Therefore, people 
who would be protected by a shield law in one state would not be af-
forded protection in some other states merely because of a more re-
strictive definition of who is a journalist.216 
a. Definition of Journalist 
 One major issue that arises in the construction of shield laws is 
how to define who can invoke the privilege guaranteed by the stat-
ute.217 There is a wide variety of ways in which the states with shield laws 
have sought to define who is a journalist or reporter for the purposes of 
the statute’s protection.218 Such a variance reflects the ongoing debate 
                                                                                                                      
211 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-21-142 (2006); Alaska Stat. § 09.25.310–.390 (2010); 
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215 See supra text accompanying note 213. 
216 See supra text accompanying note 213. 
217 See Stone, supra note 90, at 50–51. 
218 See supra text accompanying note 213. 
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in scholarly circles regarding exactly who should qualify to invoke the 
privilege.219 
 On one end of the spectrum are the extremely specific definitions 
of “journalist” that limit the extent of the privilege to traditional me-
dia.220 For example, the Alabama state shield law specifically limits its 
protections to a “person engaged in, connected with or employed on 
any newspaper, radio broadcasting station or television station, while engaged 
in a news-gathering capacity.”221 Thus, a person working outside the 
confines of these three traditional media outlets is not protected under 
Alabama’s shield law.222 
 On the other end of the spectrum are very broad definitions of 
who is a journalist.223 Such a definition is found in New York’s shield 
law, which provides protection to a “professional journalist or news-
caster presently or having previously been employed or otherwise asso-
ciated with any newspaper, magazine, news agency, press association, 
wire service, radio or television transmission station or network or 
other professional medium of communicating news or information to 
the public.”224 Further, New York’s shield law gives specific guidance in 
defining such terms as newspaper, magazine, and news agency.225 Some 
states impose specific employment requirements in order for a person 
to qualify as a journalist.226 In other states, the shield law grants protec-
tion to a “journalist” but provides no definition of who qualifies as a 
journalist for the purposes of the statute.227 
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b. Absolute or Qualified Privilege 
 Another of the central issues in the construction of shield laws is 
whether the privilege granted to reporters can be overcome.228 An ab-
solute privilege provides firm protection against compelled disclosure 
of source identities, whereas a qualified privilege allows the state to 
overcome the presumptive privilege and force disclosure of source 
identities in certain situations.229 This divergence reflects a great deal 
of debate over the balancing of the public’s right to all relevant evi-
dence with the importance of confidential sources.230 
                                                                                                                     
 Several jurisdictions that have some form of shield law protection 
grant a reporter an absolute privilege against mandatory disclosure of 
the identity of confidential sources.231 It should be noted that in Ala-
bama and Kentucky, in order for a journalist to invoke this privilege, 
the statutes mandate that the information obtained from the confiden-
tial source must be published, broadcast, or televised.232 In many other 
statutes, however, there is a marked absence of language mandating 
that the information obtained from a confidential source is published 
in order to invoke the protections of the statute.233 In still others, the 
statute states specifically that a reporter can invoke the privilege against 
mandatory disclosure of confidential sources regardless of whether the 
information obtained from such a source is ever published.234 Finally, it 
is notable that the District of Columbia, which grants absolute protec-
tion against the disclosure of the identity of a confidential source actu-
ally permits the government to compel the disclosure of other informa-
tion from the journalist, such as notes and outtakes.235 This seems to 
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reflect a judgment that the protection of source confidentiality is of the 
utmost importance.236 
 In the other jurisdictions with some form of shield law, the privilege 
against mandatory disclosure of the identity of confidential sources is 
qualified.237 It is notable that, in contrast to all of the other shield laws, 
those in Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina do not specifi-
cally mention a privilege to protect the “source” of confidential informa-
tion.238 Nevertheless, these three statutes include a qualified privilege 
protecting against compelled disclosure of “information” obtained while 
acting as a journalist; the identity of a source would presumably be in-
formation.239 In the other jurisdictions with a qualified privilege, the 
statutes explicitly indicate that the identity of a confidential source is 
within the scope of the statutory protections.240 The statutes vary widely 
in the way they express the criteria that must be established by the party 
seeking disclosure of the source’s identity in order to override the statu-
tory privilege.241 
III. Analysis 
A. The Impetus for a National Shield Law in Canada: The National Post 
Standard Does Not Adequately Protect Confidential Sources 
 The use of confidential sources in the process of investigative 
journalism is extremely important.242 The scholarship examined earlier 
in this Note demonstrates theoretically and empirically that people with 
important information of public concern may not come forward with-
                                                                                                                      
236 See id. 
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a substantial issue involved in the proceeding; (b) That the news information cannot be 
obtained by other reasonable means; and (c) That a strong interest of the party seeking to 
subpoena the newsperson outweighs the interests under the first amendment to the Unit-
ed States constitution of such newsperson in not responding to a subpoena and of the 
general public in receiving news information.”). 
242 R. v. Nat’l Post, 2010 SCC 16, [2010] 1 S.C.R.477, ¶ 33 (Can.). 
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out a guarantee of confidentiality.243 What is sought from a shield law, 
therefore, is a level of certainty at the time that a journalist makes a 
promise of confidentiality that this promise will ultimately be kept.244 
Thus, the effectiveness of the protection afforded by the standard elu-
cidated in National Post should be judged based upon whether it creates 
the necessary certainty at the time the promise is made.245 
1. Extent of the Privilege: The Burden of Proof 
 The most glaring flaw in the National Post decision is that it essen-
tially creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of disclosure.246 The 
Canadian Supreme Court in that decision stated that analysis of wheth-
er a privilege is afforded to a journalist to protect the confidentiality of 
sources will proceed on a case-by-case basis.247 Further, in order for the 
privilege to attach, the onus is on the journalist to establish that all four 
Wigmore criteria are met.248 
 In several of the U.S. states that have shield laws, the privilege is 
absolute and cannot be overcome in any circumstances.249 Many other 
U.S. states, however, grant to journalists a qualified privilege that can be 
overcome when certain statutorily specified factors are met.250 How-
ever, even in these jurisdictions, the presumption is in favor of nondis-
closure of the identity of the confidential source and the burden of 
proof remains with the party seeking disclosure.251 
                                                                                                                     
 In criticizing U.S. state shield laws that provide only a qualified priv-
ilege to reporters, one scholar stated that a major flaw with such a con-
struction of the privilege is that “[a]t the moment you speak with the 
reporter, it is impossible for you to know whether, four months hence, 
some prosecutor will or will not be able to make the requisite showing to 
pierce the privilege.”252 This criticism has even more force when the 
National Post standard is examined against it.253 In the U.S. states that 
use a qualified privilege model, at least the burden of showing that the 
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247 Nat’l Post, [2010] 1 S.C.R. ¶¶ 53, 60. 
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250 See supra text accompanying note 237. 
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253 See Nat’l Post, [2010] 1 S.C.R. ¶ 60; Stone, supra note 90, at 52. 
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privilege should be overcome rests with the prosecutor.254 Under the 
Canadian Supreme Court’s standard, a source should assume that his 
communication is not privileged.255 Such a prosecution-friendly stan-
dard creates the very type of uncertainty that discourages confidential 
sources from disclosing important information of public concern.256 
munity.259 
lier.261 
                                                                                                                     
2. Definition of “Journalist” 
 Another major flaw in the National Post standard is it fails to define 
who is a journalist for the purposes of establishing the privilege.257 In-
deed, one of the difficulties that the Canadian Supreme Court had in 
this case was determining who was a journalist.258 The potential 
breadth of the term “journalist” is a key reason cited by the Canadian 
Supreme Court for refusing to establish either a constitutional or a 
class-based im
 In contrast, in states with shield laws the vast majority of statutes 
define the term journalist.260 Of course, Maine’s statute makes no ef-
fort to narrow the scope of the term journalist, presumably leaving 
such a determination up to the reviewing court; however, this complete 
lack of a definition is an out
 The third of the four Wigmore criteria allows courts applying Na-
tional Post to distinguish between different types of journalists.262 The 
Canadian Supreme Court itself noted that “[t]he relationship between 
the source and a blogger might be weighed differently than in the case 
of a professional journalist.”263 While this statement has intuitive appeal, 
it provides relatively little guidance on exactly which types of journalists 
might be more protected under the National Post standard.264 Forcing a 
potential source with valuable information to assess beforehand whether 
 
254 See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-90-119(3) (West 2011). 
255 See Nat’l Post, [2010] 1 S.C.R. ¶ 60. 
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259 See supra text accompanying notes 153–156, 166. 
260 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-90-119(1)(e) (West 2011). 
261 Compare Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, § 61 (2010) (stating that a “journalist” cannot 
be compelled to disclose certain information but not defining the term “journalist”), with 
Cal. Evid. Code § 1070(a) (West 2009) (“[The privilege extends to a] publisher, editor, 
reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or 
other periodical publication, or by a press association or wire service, or any person who 
has been so connected or employed . . . .”). 
262 Nat’l Post, [2010] 1 S.C.R. ¶ 57. 
263 Id. 
264 See id. ¶¶ 53, 57. 
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his relationship with a particular journalist is one that ought to be “‘sed-
ulously fostered’ in the public good” creates the very type of uncertainty 
that discourages important disclosures.265 While some state shield laws 
have arguably been written or interpreted too narrowly,266 these shield 
laws at least have the virtue of creating some level of certainty as to the 
types of journalists to whom the privilege will apply.267 
3. Overall Arbitrariness 
 A third, less specific—but no less major—flaw with the National 
Post standard is the arbitrariness that it creates in deciding exactly 
which reporters in which circumstances are deserving of a privilege.268 
This is highlighted by the divergent outcomes that the Canadian Su-
preme Court arrived at in National Post and Globe & Mail.269 In National 
Post, the Canadian Supreme Court allowed compelled disclosure of ev-
idence that may serve to identify a journalist’s confidential source.270 In 
contrast, in Globe and Mail, the Canadian Supreme Court temporarily 
allowed a journalist to keep the identity of his source confidential, 
pending review by a lower court.271 The major difference leading to 
these two divergent outcomes was that the Canadian Supreme Court in 
Globe and Mail wanted the lower court to conduct a more thorough 
analysis under the fourth Wigmore criterion, whereas the National Post 
court was confident that the interests balanced in favor of disclosure.272 
Despite evidence that the lower court judge had found in favor of dis-
closure on the first three Wigmore criteria, the Canadian Supreme 
Court reasoned that the public interest in dissemination of the infor-
mation might be so strong that it could outweigh the other three crite-
ria.273 Yet the fourth Wigmore criterion is incredibly subjective.274 Si-
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multaneously, however, it is the most powerful factor in the analysis.275 
Leaving a court with such wide discretion makes the potential applica-
tion of the privilege questionable and discourages confidential sources 
from coming forward with important information.276 
B. The Need for Legislative Action: Moving Toward a Shield Law 
 To adequately protect the relationship between journalists and 
their confidential sources, many questions must be specifically ad-
dressed to avoid creating uncertainty about the protection that will be 
afforded to confidential communications.277 Many scholars writing 
about this topic examine specific concepts like the definition of a jour-
nalist and the extent of the protection afforded to confidential 
sources.278 However, as it considered whether to create a class privilege, 
the Canadian Supreme Court in National Post noted a number of prob-
lems.279 Among the issues cited were the varying degrees of profession-
alism and the Canadian Supreme Court’s own broad definition of 
journalism, determinations of whether the privilege would belong to 
the source or the journalist, a lack of workable criteria regarding the 
creation or loss of the privilege, and the inflexibility of a class privi-
lege.280 As important questions remained unanswered, the Canadian 
Supreme Court thus decided that a judicially created class privilege for 
journalists and their sources would be inappropriate.281 
 Importantly, the Canadian Supreme Court stated that “[i]t is likely 
that in future (sic) such ‘class’ privileges will be created, if at all, only by 
legislative action.”282 To address the myriad questions that prevented 
the Canadian Supreme Court from finding a class privilege for journal-
ists and their confidential sources and thus address the under-
protective nature of the National Post standard, this Note proposes that 
                                                                                                                      
probative value of the evidence sought to be obtained, measured against the public inter-
est in respecting the journalist’s promise of confidentiality.”). 
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281 See id. ¶ 42. 
282 Id. 
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the Parliament should do just what the Canadian Supreme Court has 
stated: create a class privilege that more adequately details and protects 
the important journalist-source relationship.283 
 In crafting a shield law that better protects the interests of confi-
dential sources, many issues must be addressed.284 This section will in-
vestigate two major topics that arise frequently in scholarship examining 
shield laws.285 First, the Parliament should adopt a relatively broad defi-
nition of when the privilege applies.286 Second, the Parliament should 
create a nearly absolute privilege for journalists to protect their confi-
dential sources, as this type of privilege most fully protects confidential 
sources and therefore most fully incentivizes the types of disclosure that 
any privilege seeks to encourage.287 
1. Defining Who Is a Journalist 
 One scholar notes that defining who can invoke the privilege might 
prove to be the toughest part of drafting a shield law.288 Coming up with 
a consistent definition of who qualifies as a journalist for the purposes of 
invoking the privilege may be the most important task facing a legisla-
ture.289 The importance of this definitional section is illustrated by a 
2005 case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit inter-
preting Alabama’s shield law.290 That case concerned a Sports Illustrated 
magazine article about the coach of the University of Alabama’s football 
team.291 The coach sued the magazine for libel, slander, and outrageous 
conduct.292 A major issue in the case was whether Alabama’s shield law 
statute, worded in absolute terms, provided protection to magazine re-
porters.293 The statute states that the privilege is extended to a “person 
engaged in, connected with or employed on any newspaper, radio 
broadcasting station or television station, while engaged in a news-
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gathering capacity.”294 The court in this case decided, based on the lit-
eral language of the statute, that magazine reporters were not covered 
by Alabama’s law.295 Due to this antiquated definition of the news me-
dia, it appears that many people who in modern parlance would be con-
sidered journalists are not protected by this statute.296 
e?”300 
                                                                                                                     
 However, exactly who should receive the benefit of this privilege is 
still an open question, and the subject of much debate.297 At the outset, 
it must be clear exactly to whom the privilege belongs.298 Relying on 
the law of privilege, it is clear that the privilege against compelled dis-
closure of a source’s identity belongs to the source.299 Thus, one 
scholar properly rephrases the question as “to whom may a source 
properly disclose information in reasonable reliance on the belief that 
the disclosure will be protected by the journalist-source privileg
 Although it is necessary to have the correct question in mind, it 
does not help in defining to whom a source might reasonably disclose 
confidential information.301 This lack of clarity is most notable in the 
ongoing debate about whether to extend the privilege to include blog-
gers and other non-traditional media.302 Many state shield laws err on 
the side of caution in their definition of who is a journalist and subse-
quently extend the privilege only to mostly traditional media.303 How-
ever, the exclusion of non-traditional media such as blogs overlooks the 
fact that such non-traditional media can often be media through which 
information of substantial public value is disclosed.304 For example, in 
the United States, bloggers contributed substantially to public discourse 
when they noted inaccuracies in a CBS News story about President 
 
294 Ala. Code § 12-21-142 (2006). 
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Bush’s stint in the military.305 The network eventually rescinded its sto-
ry.306 
 Therefore, the question of to whom a source can properly disclose 
confidential information while being assured that the shield law will 
apply should be answered by returning to the very purpose of crafting a 
privilege.307 The impetus for a shield law establishing a journalist-
source privilege is to encourage a source to come forward with infor-
mation important to the public.308 Looking at it in this light, it is clear 
that in some cases, bloggers may be conduits to the public who can dis-
close important information.309 Therefore, excluding non-traditional 
media fully from statutory protections may create an underinclusive 
shield law.310 
                                                                                                                     
 Thus, in defining the scope of the privilege, the answer must rest 
in functional considerations, while keeping in mind the very purpose 
of the journalist-source privilege.311 In line with this method of think-
ing, one scholar proposes that the source must make a disclosure to a 
“journalist” reasonably believing that this “journalist” regularly distrib-
utes information to the public and with the intention that the informa-
tion divulged to the “journalist” will be distributed to the public.312 Al-
though this definition has intuitive appeal as it is in line with the 
interests that a privilege seeks to protect, it may be too broad.313 As the 
goal of a privilege is to encourage disclosure of the information in 
which the public has an interest, it makes sense to limit this definition 
further by imposing a condition that the “journalist” to whom the 
source makes a disclosure must report “on issues of public concern.”314 
The shield laws of several states are already tailored to protect only con-
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2. The Need for a Nearly Absolute Privilege 
 Another central question any legislature must address when creat-
ing a shield law is whether the privilege is to be absolute or qualified.316 
Absolute privileges have been less popular politically and with the 
courts in the United States than qualified privileges.317 However, an 
absolute privilege has the virtue of bringing “greater consistency to the 
law.”318 One scholar notes that the purpose of a privilege is to incentiv-
ize the disclosure of important information in which the public has an 
interest; however, “the uncertainty surrounding the application of the 
qualified privilege directly undercuts this purpose and is grossly unfair 
to sources, whose disclosures we are attempting to induce.”319 
 Exceptions should be crafted only to account for very narrow cir-
cumstances in which the public’s interest in evidence substantially out-
weighs the journalist’s interest in keeping his source’s identity confi-
dential.320 One such exception is when the source has information 
about a “grave crime or serious breach of national security that is likely 
to be committed imminently.”321 This parallels the U.S. jurisprudence 
around the psychotherapist-patient privilege when the psychotherapist 
learns that the patient intends to commit harm to himself or an-
other.322 In these narrow circumstances, the public’s interest in evi-
dence so clearly outweighs the journalist-source privilege that it would 
be “irresponsible” to privilege the disclosure.323 However, it is necessary 
for the Parliament, in crafting a shield law, to define exact and narrow 
circumstances in which these exceptions would apply; any less would 
create the type of uncertainty that discourages the disclosure of infor-
mation of value to the public.324 
 The other necessary exception involves the case when a source’s 
disclosure is unlawful in and of itself.325 Keeping in mind that the pur-
pose of a shield law is to foster the disclosure of information in which 
the public has a substantial interest, the fact that a disclosure has al-
ready been declared unlawful means that such a disclosure has already 
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been found not to be in the public interest.326 Therefore, most illegal 
disclosures should not be privileged.327 Such a disclosure should only 
be privileged when it involves a leak of governmental information 
which has “‘substantial public value.’”328 
Conclusion 
 Canada and the United States are consistently two of the world’s 
leading nations when it comes to overall freedom of the press. These 
two nations, however, share a troubling history of subpoenaing journal-
ists in order to ascertain the identities of their confidential sources 
when such information will aid in criminal prosecutions or civil litiga-
tion. The Canadian Supreme Court recently handed down two deci-
sions that affirmatively established a reporter’s privilege under com-
mon law. This privilege is decided on a case-by-case basis and only 
attaches after the journalist has proven several specified factors. The 
United States has a longer history with the journalist-source privilege. 
In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case which did not establish 
a reporter’s privilege but left the door open for one. Seizing on this 
opportunity, different circuits have developed different iterations of 
this privilege. Individual states, however, have created the strongest pro-
tections for the journalist-confidential source relationship: forty states 
have enacted a statutory reporter’s privilege. These statutes, called 
shield laws, firmly establish the rights granted to journalists and their 
confidential sources. Upon close inspection, it becomes clear that the 
Canadian Supreme Court’s case-by-case model of privilege is simply 
insufficient. The uncertainty created by this ad hoc analysis discourages 
the very types of confidential disclosures that a privilege seeks to incen-
tivize. Canada’s Parliament should craft a shield law that clearly estab-
lishes a reporter’s privilege and avoids the type of uncertainty created 
by the current standard. In doing so, the Parliament could learn much 
from U.S. states, which already have a great deal of experience in this 
area. Ultimately, a better shield law will include a fairly broad and func-
tional definition of who is a journalist and thus who qualifies for the 
privilege and will be nearly absolute, with very few exceptions for only 
the most pressing circumstances. 
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